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I . INTRODUCTION
The present phase of nuclear reactor development is characterized by the
trend to large units of thermal reactors and by the demonstrated competitiveness
of nuclear power. Since the economical use of a nuclear plant in apower grid
may call for a Iocation close to industrial or population centers, siting of
nuclear power plants should not be restricted by population density and other
safety related site parameters.
Making a power plant independent on siting means avoiding any hazard to
the environment. Therefore, the design of a containment of a site-independent
nuclear reactor plant should accomplish the following points:
1. Leakage of activity during and after any accident suitably low
2. Integrity during accident
3. Leakage and integrity constant over plant life.
Several low leakage containment concepts have been proposed and h~ve been
applied to power plants of the present generation of thermal reactors L1/. Be-
cause absolute leaktightness of containment shells i8 technically not feasible,
certain leakrates principally must be taken into account. At present a design
leakage around I % of contained volume per day 1s considered reasonable with
regard to safeguards requirement and economics. However. potential hazards to
the environment depend both on the design leak rate of the containment and on the
actual course of accident considered. In particular the time function of pressure
and activity distribution in the contained volume has to be knotvn. Hence, the
containment design is dictated by the maximum conceivable accident for a particular
plant, which we, therefore, call the Design Basis Accident.
In the following. we shall (1) explain the most important nifferences
between the design basis accidents in thermal water reactors as compared to fast
sodium cooled reactors, (2) describe the accident which ,vas chosen as design
basis accident in the conceptual design study of a 300 HHe prototype reactor,
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(3) draw conclusions from these considerations for the engineering layout of the
containment and engineered safeguards. Finally, we will give some data on the
activity re18ase showing the effectiveness of the double containment concept
chosen for that prototype reactor.
DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTS IN THEroL~ WATER F~ACTORS Al~ FAST SODlill1 REACTORS
The accident which determines the containment design of thermal water reactors
is commonly considered to be the main coolant line rupture with subsequent failure
of emergertey cooling l~7. Because the thermal water reactor is inhere~tly shut dOvffi
by loss ofcoolant, this accident leads to core meltdOvrrl only due to fission pro-
duct de~ay heat a6companied by release of fission productsand other radioactive
material fram ehe fuel to the primary system and hence into the reactor building.
It 1s difficult to establish the release rates from the fuel for the various
fission products as function of time and temperature for a given accident. lfuwever,
we can state, that meltdovYn and subsequent fission product release in athermal
water reactor is certainly a matter of hours. This means that energy transfer
from the primary system is slow and no phenomena of rapid energy transfer should
be anticipated.
Furthermore, the maximum temperature possible during this design basis
accident will not exceed the fuel melting temperature because of the slow power
generation by fission product decay in the system. Therefore, it 1s concluded
that in thermal reactors it is essentially thermal processes which govern the
energy and activity release in a large accident and determine the requirements
for the containment design.
Design basis accidents in sodium-cooled fast reactors may differ remarkably
from those in thermal water reactors. This is mainly due to two reasons:
First the fue! in the core is not arranged in its most reactive configura-
tion, i.e. inadvertent movement of fuel can lead to increase in reactivity.
Secondly, the void coefficient of reactivity in sodium is positive at least
over the central region of the core.
The first effect is not considered to be a major problem, because inadvertent
movement of fuel into a more reactive configuration can be precluded by design.
Bowing effects, which were troublesome to the 11ark II-core of the EBR-I plant
are now understood thoroughly.
The second effect can be of importance if a complete safety system failure
1s assumed accompanied by loss of flow due to pump failure and subsequent over-
heating in a number of coolant channels. Then, with further pessimistic assump-
tions the sodilli~ void effect may lead to a nuclear excursion with subsequent fuel
melting and even fuel vaporization. Although the prompt negative Doppler effect
and core disassembly llill terminate the reactivity excursion, an energy release
of several hundred ~rrJsec may then be envisaged L~7. Additionally, thermal pro-
cesses can take place due to the fact that during the excursion fuel may be
dispersed into sodium still present in the coolant channels L~7. Depending on
how the fuel comes into contact with sodium, a rapid energy transfer may be
encountered. This fuel-coolant interaction could add to the destructive poten-
tial of the nuclear phase of the excursion.
Discussing more principally the safety philosophy of fast reactors we Dust
emphasize that both effects are only virtually relevant, i.e. a number of un-
probable events, particularly failure or the safety system, has to be assumed
before fuel movement or sodium voiding can occur. Ne should always bear in mind
that the safety of large nuclear plants relies on engineered safeguards any-
way. Therefore, assuming the reliable performance of engineered safeguards
~nder accident conditions i5 one way to develop a safe nuclear reactor design
and i8 - as we believe - a realistic ~'J:iY. Assuming the failnre of engineered
safeguards during a.n acciclent i8 another Fay of. safety philosophy which is
certainly more pessimistic aud conserve':t:Lve. As ~J5.11 be outlined later in detail
we took the second (i.e. the conservative) way for our coneeptual design study,
whien is not neeessarily in agreeTi0.nt with other fast reactor development groups.
For instanee, the British da not implem2nt in their design philosophy nuclear
excursions tJhich del:i.ver major amounts of energy. Therefore, the design philo-
sophy in Gei~any of taking iuto account extrcmely remote accident conditions
and add costly engineered safcguards to cover hypothetical accidents should be
considered as very conservativ0. Be believc that design principles on ~Jhieh the
present engineering lc.yeut of fast soc1it'm cC'o1e.d reac;:ors in Ger~nany is based
can be relaxed in the n82r future ;;:S more safety research has b1.lilt up sufficient
confidence in the perfonn"O'lce of S0c1i1.TJ1 c'Joled br!.C'2c1e:s.
According to the present status or safety philosophy for fast sodium-cooled
reactors and the foregoing eOT.lsideraticn3 \;'1e eBrl. cODe.lude th2.t whereas in thermal
water reactors esseutially thermal processes govE~n the course of the design basis
accident~ in fast sodium cooled reactors nuclear and thermal processes govern
energyand activity r.elea~eo T11e result of-thi.s ph51oS0j1hy :13 the incorporation
of a containment against energy release and a containment against activity re-
lease in the design of the fast sodium cooled Iea~tor prototypeo
3. DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT OF TRE NA-2-REACTOR
In the following safety assessment and design philosophy are further ex-
plained athand of the Design Basis Accident, vhich has been assumed for the
eonceptual design study of a 300 HHe prototype fast breeder reaetor. This so-
called 1'1a-2 study is currently undenray a3 a joint effert of the Huclear ::leseareh
Center Karlsruhe and thc industrial group Siemens!Interatom. A final report of
this study will be published soon. A very ecnservativ2 approach was taken both
in the safety assessment and engineering layout. This decision was made in vie~~
of the early date of commitment, whieh is scheduled for 1969 and on account of
today's ineomplete knouledge in the fields of engineering. safety and physics.
The main characteristics and performance data of Na"2 are as follotifs:
Core: Mixed oxide fuel pins of 6 mm o.d. a~d 95 em active height are
bundled in hsxagonal trrapper- tubes. Power flattening is achieved by tuo radial
zones of different enrichment. Coolant flow is upward through core and blanket.
The core is positionec. by a louer and an upper grid pLotte. The pOT/Jer rating is
elose to 1 InJth!kg of fissile Plutonium, and the total hreeding ratio averages
1.3.
Primary system~ A locp design was chosen for the primary cooling system
consisting of three main and DifO auxiliary loops. Coolant entr6 is at the bottom
of the reactor vessel. Reaetor outlet temperature range is 560 C - 5800 C yieldingo . 0in steam temperatures between 520 C a~d 540 C.
Fuel handling~ A system of three rotating plugs 1s employed for refueling.
Intermediate storage positions for sperrt fuel are provided within the vessel.
Containment: The plant is designed to accomodate the potential consequenees
of a nuclear excursion releasing 1000 l1Hsec of destn~ctiye energy. Double con-
tainment was chosen ecnsisting of two independent leaktight steel barriers in
series and separated by a large air plenus. The inner containment 1s filled with
nitrogen.
Föt: thereference design of Na~2a. broad spectrum of hypothetical failures
leading to uncoutröl1ed reactivity ifisertions haG been analysed. On the basis
of thes.e ifivastigatiol1.s it i3 concltided, thC'.t reacti\rity excursions leading to
a Core destiruction CEm be discoUllted, urüess one assumes gross failure of a
mainprtinary system compone.nt such as ghillotine type pipe rupture, complete
blockage 6f coolant flövl ror the enti.re core ~ loss of sodium from the core,
coiI1cidihg vJ:i.th cömplete mal-funct:!.on of the safety system. For the c~rrent
design study, such a very u~likely simultaneous failure of a vital reactor compo-
n9nt ahd the entire safety system has been assumed as th8 design basis accident
for the plant.
A typical seqwmce of e,.,ents c'.llTainating in thc DBA is given belmv:
1. All prima:cy <foolant pumps fall simultaneously.
2. The reactor is not shutdovm by the safety system.
3. The stagnant coolant in the core is heated above its boiling point.
4. Desuperheating is suddenly initiated? and the coolant starts being
expelled from the core by the vapor pressure.
5. Due to the positive Na-void coefficient? the expulsion leads to a
reactivity insertion of about 50 ~/sec.
6. The resulting nuclear excursion i8 terminated by core disassembly and
Doppler feedback.
7. Vaporizcd and malten fuel is intimately mixed with the remainder of the
sodium in the corc, resulting in a rapid vaporization of the sodium.
8. Mechantcal work i8 done on the environmental structure of the core.
9. Fuel isotopes and fission products are released instantaneously.
On the basis of a careful and conservative analysis of this hypothetical
accident it is concluded, that its destructive potential~ i.e. the amount of
energy available to do rnechanical work, is less than 1000 ~R1sec. About one half
of this energy is contributed by the nuclear excursion 9 and the remainder by the
consequential sodium vapor expansion. Hmvever? knowing the destructive potential
of the DBA is not sufficient to design engineered safeguards against its conse-
quences. Depending mainly on the rate at which the thermal energy i8 transferred
to the sodium, three different destructive phenomena have to be considered:
shock waves, water hammer effects and internal blast pressure.
4. ENGINEERING LAYOUT OF CONTAINl1ENT
4.1 Design Criteria
For the design of the containment the following requirements regarding the
DBA have been established~
1. All immediate mechanical effects capable of producing damage to structural
components? such as shock waves, "rater hammer effects? and internal blast
pressure, shall not propagate beyond the reactor cavity.
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2. All secondary effects, such as residual pressure. chemica1 reactions, deeay
heat of the core debris. sha11 not impair the integrity of the first con-
tainment barriere
3. Tue f;,rst containment ~arrier shaH,be sufficiently tight to prevent a sodium
fire in the outer containment aIid gross leakage df radioactive material.
~. J
4~ The first contaihmerltshall be 4omptet~1y etlveloped by a seddhdary eofifäin-
ment As a final bartier for rad10active material.
s. Decay heät from the cdre debris shalI b~ remöV'cd 1:>y nattlral ödriveetion bf
sodiuii1.
4.2 Containment against energy release
First, the design provisions against the damage producing phenomena are
briefly described. A scheme of the reector cavity is shmm in fig.l. Tt is shown.
that design provisions against water hammer effects would have to be opposed to
those tending to decrease the internal blast pressure: In order to limit the
internal blast pressure to a value below the burst pressure of the reactor ves-
seI, one would provide a rather large gas plenum below the rotating plug. On
the other hand, in case of rather quick energy release from the sodium fuel
reaction. the high pressure sodium vapor bubble at the eore loeation might
accelerate a column of liquid sodium towards the vesse1 head. thereby concen-
trating most of the total energy to a si.ngle and most vulnerable components of
the system. Obviously there is no reasonable way to solve both problems simul-
taneously. Therefore, in the present design it is not intended to keep the
reactor vessel intact against the internal blast pressure. because failure of
the vessel would be less hazardous to the containment integrity than failure
of the plug holddovm. The rotating plug is divided horizontally into two parts
with the cover gas plenum in between. The lower part of the plug is emerged in
the sodium, so that water hammer effects are precluded. The rotating plug and
its holddo,~ mechanism are designed for apressure exceeding the burst pressure
of the vessel, which has a section of reduced wall thickness just below the
plug. Thus, the internal blast pressure will be released into the reactor cavity
rather than into the reactor containment building.
For the design of the explosion containment structure the effective energy
from both the nuclear phase and from the sodium vapor explosion are conservatively
considered in terms of an equivalent charge of 500 lb of T~IT. The reactor vessel
is surrounded by a closed steel structure capable of absorbing the shock wave
created energy by plastic flow of material without transferring considerable
forces or momentum to the cavity walls. In the analysis no credit was taken for
the containment potential of the vessel, internals and the vessel itself. The
peak pressure following the burst would be less than 10 at. The explosion
containment structure is designed to sustain this pressure and release it to
the adjacent cells of the primary system without loading the concrete walls
of the cavity. Within a few seconds after the excursion the equilibrium pressure
will be below 1 at.
Above the rotating plug there is a nitrogen filled cel1 which is separated from
the operational area by a leaktight lid as part of the primary containment barriere
Its purpose is to prevent a sodium fire in the secondary containment fol1owing
t':le DBA, should sod1um be ejected through and alongside the rotating plug.
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Special emphasis was paid on providing long term decay heat removal capacity
from the coretrespectively from the fragments of the core. ~vo auxiliary cooling
loops are particularly designed to remaih operable after the DBA, i.e. even after
a severe rüpture cf the vessel or the pipes. Loss cf coolant from the core is
discounted by minimizingthe free volufue in the primaty sodium cells and by pro-
viding södiutn reservoir tanks ,lhich wbuld drain by gtavity inte the vessel or
into th$ reactor cavity.Additionally. three natural convection NaK looDs are
embeddedin the wall of the reactor cell; whete they are protected against the
blast effedts öf the DBA; for decay heat removal and eooling of the concrete
structüre.
4.3 Cp~tainme~t against activity release
As w&S mentioned before~ a double containment against activity release con-
sisting of two steel shells in series was chosen for this conceptual design study.
The reason for chosing a double containment design are twofold:
First~ as will be Shovffi later, uncomplete data about activity release have
us forced according to our conservative safety p!1ilosophy to assume pessimistic
data for the release parameter.
Secondly, the outer containment filled with air to facilitate access and
maintenance shall contain any sodium fire which is credible during reactor opera-
tion. maintenance or repair work. Because the integrity of the inner containment
can be guaranteed for the DBA a sodium fire together with the DBA can be ruled
out.
T,;ro alternate but similar containment layouts have been investigated from
which one will be explained here. A scheme is sho,vn in figure 2.
All primary sodium and auxiliary equipment cells in the lower part of the
building are filled with nitrogen and are interconnected to take advantage of
maximum available volume for pressure relief after the DBA. They are completely
enveloped by a steel liner~ whose primary function is to prevent a sodium fire
and consequential pressure and temperature buildup in the air filled room above
the operating floor. -Since for this purpose it has to be rather leaktight~ it
is considered as the primary contaip~ent barrier also with regard to fission
products and aerosols. This containment will be designed so that operating per-
sonnel may enter through locks for rcpair or maintenance of the auxiliary systems
during reactor operation without interrupting contaiTh~ent integrity.
The outer containment is a conventional all welded lo,] leakage steel buil-
ding, approximately 54 m in overall height with a diameter of about 33 m. A
flat bottom is used for maximum space utilization. A particular feature of this
concept is that both contairnent barriers are conpletely separated by a continuous
airfilled gap. At the bottom, this is achieved by a grid type support of the
entire inner containment. ~fuether or not the principle of complete structural
independence of the two containments will have to be verified at the bottom
also. has not yet been decided. The large air volQme in between the two contain-
ment barriers will act as a high capacity low pressure plenum effectively re-
ducing leakage of radioactive material in the DBA.
The activity release and subsequent radiation burden due to inhalation of
radioactive material was calculated accordin~ to the conditions of the DBA for
the cases of single and double containment concept. Because the site of this
reactor has not been selected, the meteorological diffusion eonditions of another
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German reactor installation were used~ Data about fission prodlict telb~s~ ffom
fast sodium cooled reactors are not yet available as theyarefor~th~tfualwater
reactQrs. Therefore we took the classical values from TID~14844 /5/ (release
fraction 0.5 for halogens, 0.01 for sölid fission products) assu;fng an additional
retentibn fad tor for the halogens arid volatile fission products because of the
good trapping capability of sodium. Plate-out for halogens and volatile fission
procluctswas assumed to be exponential in both containments with a half time
of 1 höur. For the solid fission products including Plutonium we assumed a plate-
out half time of 10 hours. The leak rates at maximum pressure were 1 Vol %/day
for ehe single containment concept and 10 Vol %/day for the primary and 1 Vol %/day
for the secondary shell in the double containment concept. The resulting numbers
are given in table 1.
It can be concluded that a double containment without filter system or other
TABLE 1: Design Basis Accident Doses due to Incorporation
(800 m, do~~wind, inversion)
Single Containment Double Containment
Time of Exposure (h) 2 3 24 2 8 24
IBone Dose (rem) 850 2900 5200 0,07 3,5 30
Thyroid Dose (rem) 230 300 305 0,01 0,07 0,08
the containment atmosphere decontaminating equipment i5 capable of minimizing
the radiation burden of the environment to the point of site independence for
the plant if we use the 25 rem accident dose as a yard-stick. It may be emphasized
that this is accomplished without any engineered safeguards which must be put
into operation after the DBA has occured. The simple double containment concept
proves suitable for large fast sodium-cooled reactors of the size of 300 ~fiJe
avoiding any hazards to the environment.
It should be noted that 1arger reactor plant sizes up to 1000 tnJe are the
ultimate goal of the present fast reactor development phase. Depending on the
DBA of that size reactors it may come out, that even the very conservative and
pessimistic assumptions made at present in the activity release may lead to a
higher radiation burden than reported in table 2. This would make necessary
further improvement of the containment concept described. HO\Jever, two possi-
bilities are seen to imply further reduction of the environmental radiation
burden.
First the concrete cylinder surrounding the outer containment to attenuate
the direct y-radiation of fission products through the containment shell may
be covered by a 1eaktight steel roof. Connecting the air gap in between those
shel1s to an exhaust- and filtering system the leakage could be reduced further
by a few orders of magnitude. lfuwever, this system has to be put into operation
immediately after the DBA has occured which might be questionable in respect to
reliability.
Secondly, the release models currently in use may be improved taking into
account the real physical and chemical processes and transport phenomena occuring
in the DBA. For instance, the release of 1 % solids from the core assumed in
the calculations reported above 'VJOuld mean for a 1000 i1\Je fast sodium-cooled
breeder that about 100 kg core material can stay airborne as aerosol in the
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containment during the accidant. This see~s to be ~ rather unrealistic assump-
tion. In the Karlsruhe Nucl~at Research Center, therefore, a program was iriiti-
ated to study activity release and transport characteristics of fission product
and Plutonium aerosols fro~ fast reactor cores as ~unction of large fast reactor
accident conditions. We hope to provide seon suffibient data which may allow
even redliction of the humber cf containment shells for large fast sodium cooled
reactots.
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Fot the conceptual design of a 300 l1We sodium cooled fast breeder prototype
reactor a severe nuclear excursion is assumed as the Design Basis Accident.
Based on a very conservative analysis of this accident a double-containment
concept is chosen for that reactor design.
It is sho,~ that this concept is capable of containing the Design Basis
Accident without any hazard to the environment.
lmproved knowledge in accident analysis, activity release, and engineered
safeguards are expected to facilitate single containment designs for large fast
breeder reactors sodium cooled.
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